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Local Government Annual Report:
an Accountability Medium?
Introduction
Traditional public sector accountability codes and channels are undergoing profound changes, which emphasise the role of accounting systems in measuring and evaluating both financial and service performance, promoting disclosure and communicating results to stakeholders Guarini, 1999) . As a consequence, in many countries, external reporting is being transformed with the aim of making it more consistent with the new need for accountability.
The role of the annual report in rendering government accountable is often emphasised (for example, Ryan et al., 2000; Taylor and Rosair, 2000; Coy et al., 2001 ) and sometimes questioned (for example, Jones et al., 1985; Jones, 1992; Priest et al., 1999) .
The existence and identity of annual report users are debated, while the actual use of the annual report by readers is not clearly known.
In Italy, the word "accountability" does not have a specific translation and was virtually unknown until recently, but it has become increasingly common in public sector reform discourse (for example, see Caperchione and Pezzani, 2000) , inspiring accounting and reporting changes over the last decade. For example, Local government (LG) external reporting was significantly reformed in 1995. As a consequence, LGs were required to prepare an annual report, including the traditional cash-and obligation-based reports, a financial statement, and a number of compulsory efficiency and effectiveness indicators.
LGs were also encouraged to prepare a "term" statement, showing the achievements and actions of the Council over the elected term.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the actual role played by the LG annual report as a means of discharging accountability to potential users. To this end, the content of a sample of Italian LG annual reports was analysed and a survey was conducted in order to investigate the actual categories of users of the annual report, the degree of users' interest in the annual report as perceived by preparers, the actual use of "term statements" or alternative means of communicating results to users, the amount and the mix of information disclosed in the annual reports.
The results of the analysis show that annual reports are seemingly used to discharge accountability to "internal" users, even if it is not clear if they are actually read. At the same time, they have no significant role in communicating to external users. Most LGs do not use alternative tools to account for their performance to their stakeholders.
Moreover, they simply comply with law requirements in preparing their annual report, often producing poor quality reporting, in which accrual-based results and service performance evaluation still have a marginal place. As a consequence, the actual role of the annual report and the overall degree of accountability of Italian LGs should be questioned.
The paper is organised into five sections. Section 2 provides a short background on
Italian
LGs and their accounting and reporting systems. Section 3 briefly examines the relevant literature and specifies the aim of the paper. Section 4 explains the methodology adopted. Section 5 illustrates the results of the analysis. Section 6 discuss the results and draws some conclusions.
Background: Local Government and Local Government Accounting and

Reporting in Italy
During the last decade, Italian LGs have undergone a profound reform process, prompted by various legislative initiatives inspired by managerialism and marketisation principles and aimed (see also Mussari, 1997; Marcon, 1999) at (i) recognising greater organisational and financial autonomy to LGs; (ii) increasing managerial autonomy and accountability; (iii) contracting out and privatising activities.
More specifically, since 1990, LGs have been given more autonomy in levying taxes and determining fees for services, have witnessed a steady reduction in the amount of transfers from higher levels of government and have been encouraged to spin off their activities. During the same period:
-the ideas of managing by results, of "letting the managers manage", of the separation between elected roles and administrative ones, of introducing a "managerial culture" and a "managerial model" as opposed to the traditional and prevailing "bureaucratic model" (Mussari, 1994; Anselmi, 1995; Borgonovi, 1996) in the Italian public sector have been publicised in conferences, books, articles and by schools of management and universities.
-the Italian public sector has been subjected to a general claim for higher transparency in the use of public resources (also as a consequence of the "mani pulite" and "tangentopoli" events -concerning cases of financial scandals and corruption -) and for greater accountability for the quantity and the quality of the services provided to citizens.
-European Union countries were expected to comply with the Maastricht Treaty requirements. As a consequence, stress on improving the public sector financial situation was very high in Italy.
Before 1995, Italian LG accounting had traditionally been on a cash and obligation basis and focused on budgetary compliance. In 1995, a decree reforming LG accounting was introduced, requiring LGs:
-to maintain the traditional cash-and obligation-based system. Its pivotal role in LG budgeting, accounting and reporting is confirmed.
-to publish an accrual-based financial statement consisting of a statement of financial position and an operating statement. This does not imply the introduction of doubleentry bookkeeping, which is not mandatory. A LG can derive its balance sheet and operating statement from its cash accounting statements through a complex system of year-end adjustments. A specific reconciliation statement must be included in the overall year-end financial report to reconcile the cash-based accounting statements with the balance sheet and the operating statement.
-to adopt managerial control systems.
As a consequence, LGs are now required to prepare an annual report, that contains the traditional statement, showing compliance with the cash-and obligation-based budget, as well as the financial statement. Some standard compulsory efficiency and effectiveness indicators are imposed, while no specific requirements exist for popular reporting or service effort and accomplishment evaluation.
LGs are also encouraged to prepare a "term" statement, showing the achievements and actions of the Council over the elected term, whose structure and contents are not specified. An external Audit Committee, appointed by the Council, is charged with auditing the budget and the annual report.
Some analyses (Anessi Pessina and Steccolini, 1999; Caperchione, 2002) concerning the implementation of accrual-based reporting in LGs show that: (i) LGs have generally prepared their accrual-based financial statement but few have adopted a double-entry bookkeeping system; (ii) most LGs do not seem to pay enough attention to their accrual-based reports, and perhaps view accrual-based reporting as an unnecessary nuisance; (iii) accrual-based financial statements contain frequent inconsistencies; some items are often omitted while others have unexpectedly large values; the quality of disclosure is rather poor; (iv) internal decision making is still inspired by cash-and obligation-based information.
Theoretical notes and research questions
The present section shortly reviews relevant literature on the concept of accountability, the role of the annual report as an accountability medium and the users of annual report.
Finally, it specifies the purpose of the paper and the research questions addressed.
Accountability: a multifaceted and evolving concept
An increasing body of literature has attempted to define the concept of accountability in the public sector (for example, GASB, 1987; Staats, 1990; Patton, 1992; Caperchione and Pezzani, 2000; Taylor and Rosair, 2000) , to capture its multiple facets (Stewart, 1984; Jenkins, 1985, 1993; Sinclair, 1995; Johnston and Romzek, 1999; Guarini 2000) and to describe the evolution that codes and channels of accountability are undergoing in the context of public sector reforms and change processes (Cochrane, 1993; Ogden, 1995; Rubin, 1996; Parker and Gould, 1999; Anessi Pessina and Borgonovi, 2000) .
Accountability involves "being obliged to explain one's actions, to justify what one does" (GASB, 1987) and may be viewed in terms of a setting, where one party (the accountor) is accountable to another party (accountee) for an action, process, output or outcome (Patton, 1992; Degeling et al., 1996) . The accountor must account and report to the accountee, who has the right to obtain information and to use it in order to evaluate the accountor. Consequently, accountability involves both the giving of information (to account) and the evaluation of the information obtained in order to judge (to hold to account) (Stewart, 1984: 14-15) . Accounting provides one important, though not the sole, component of the "account element". A comprehensive concept of accountability requires not only the availability of information, but also that the information is ( i) reliable, and qualitatively satisfying; (ii) understandable; (iii) accessible; (iv) in a wider view, it is diffused, distributed, disseminated (Herzlinger, 1996; Coy et al., 2001) . Finally, accountability requires a judgement from the accountee, and the possibility of a feedback, a sanction.
Accountability is a multifaceted and complex concept. Consequently, it is necessary to specify who is accountable, to whom, why, through which means (Patton, 1992; Mussari, 1996: 167) , and it is possible to identify different "types" of accountabilities. A "ladder" of accountability (from accountability by standards to accountability by judgement): -accountability for probity and legality -process accountability -performance accountability -programme accountability -policy accountability Gray and Jenkins (1985; Three different codes of accountability result from the combination of different "rationalities" (legal, economic, technical, social, political):
financial accountability (combining legal and economic rationality and emphasising probity, compliance, efficiency) -managerial accountability (influenced by legal, economic and technical rationality; it is focused on responsibility for organisational integration, for the regularity, consistency and efficiency in service provision) -professional accountability (social rationality is combined with legal and technical rationality, emphasising the responsibility for the accessibility, the appropriateness and the quality of the services provided, for the attention to client needs) Sinclair (1995)
The author distinguishes: -public accountability (answering public concerns about administrative activity) -political accountability (linking public servants to the CEO, who is accountable to the elected body, which, in turn, is accountable to the electorate) -managerial accountability (focused on monitoring inputs, outputs, outcomes) -administrative accountability (focused on monitoring input transformation processes) -professional accountability (refers to the sense of duty of a member of a professional group) -personal accountability (fidelity to personal conscience)
Rubin (1996)
The author distinguishes: -responding to bureaucratic or hierarchical authority (demonstrating compliance with law) -reporting to the public (how their money was spent) -holding elected officials responsible for budget outcomes and the quality of financial management -direct citizen control or influence over the formation of the budget, the allocation process, and priorities in the budget
Johnston and Romzek (1999)
On the basis of the degree of autonomy of the accountor (low v. high) and of the source of expectations and /or control (internal v. external), they distinguish:
hierarchical accountability (low degree of autonomy; internal source of expectations) -legal accountability (low degree of autonomy; external source of expectations) -professional accountability (high degree of autonomy; internal source of expectations) -political accountability (high degree of autonomy; external source of expectations) Guarini (2000) On the basis of the measurement object (viability of the single LG v. viability of the web of organisations converging on the LG) and of the information users (internal v. external) he distinguishes: -managerial accountability (viability of the LG; internal users) -partnership accountability (viability of the web of organisations; internal users) -public accountability (viability of the LG; external users) -governance accountability (viability of the web of organisations; external users)
Taylor and Rosair (2000)
They distinguish: -fiduciary accountability (which deals with compliance matters) -managerial accountability (which involves efficiency and effectiveness).
Accountability has been approached historically in different ways (Rubin, 1996) and the prevailing idea of public accountability changes over time (see table 2) as a consequence of changes in the social, cultural, political context (Cochrane, 1993; Ogden, 1995; Degeling et al., 1996) . The last decades have generally witnessed shifts in the idea of accountability diffused in the public sector: for example, from a concern for "fiduciary", or probity-and process-accountability, focused on compliance, to an emphasis on "managerial" or performance and programme accountability, focused on effectiveness and efficiency, outcomes and outputs. At the same time, as Guthrie (1993) and Parker and Gould (1996) point out, public sector reforms have often meant a shift from "parliamentary" accountability to a regime of accountability which is more "market-and customer-oriented".
The changes in accountability codes influence and/or justify the features of the tools used to account and the type of information given (Stewart, 1984; Sinclair, 1995) .
Paralleling the changes in public accountability pattern and regimes, LG accounting and measurement systems have been generally interested by profound changes, which can be summarised as follows (Guthrie et al., 1998: 18; Guarini, 1999; Caperchione, 2000) :
(i) introduction of accrual based-accounting systems; (ii) adoption of tools for measuring non financial performance and assessing public organisations' efficiency and effectiveness; (iii) adoption of alternative tools for communicating effectively to the stakeholders, such as popular reporting.
The role of the annual report in discharging accountability
The annual report, although not reporting on the overall accountability of a governmental entity, is generally considered to be a primary medium of accountability (for example, Boyne and Law, 1991; Ryan et al., 2000; Taylor and Rosair, 2000; Coy et al., 2001; Mack et al., 2001) . Nevertheless, some dispute the ability of annual reports to discharge accountabilities and question their value and usefulness, whereas others underline the use of other communication tools by public organisations.
Those who underline the weaknesses of the annual report as a disclosure tool point out that there is little demand for the information it provides (Jones and Pendlebury, 1996) , that the number or users is likely to be small (Jones, 1992) , that the annual report may not contain all the relevant information that users seek, that the information may be presented in too complex a format and the reports may not be directly available and accessible to potential users (for example, Jones et al., 1985) . Priest et al. (1999) , who conduct a survey on potential and actual users of LG annual reports in Western Australia, find that 15% of respondents declare that they are not interested in their council's annual report and about a half indicate that they do not read it, mainly because it is inaccessible. Brusca Alijarde (1997) carries out a study on the degree of usefulness that auditors and finance directors of Spanish LGs assign to financial statements and to their items. She concludes that financial reporting in Spanish
LGs can be useful for finance directors, management, Audit Offices and lenders, but the information provided is not used to its maximum. Mellemvik et al. (1988) underline that, although normative literature assigns to accounting two main functions (accountability and decision making), in analysing accounting in action a variety of different functions emerge, notably the support of processes of legitimation and the exercise of power.
As far as alternative channels and forms to disclose performance information are concerned, Ryan et al. (2000) , who interview preparers of Australian public organisations' annual reports, find that preparers consider the annual report as being an important tool for the discharge of accountabilities, but, in some cases, they feel that alternative forms of communication are more suitable to satisfy the information demands of stakeholders. According to Kloot and Martin (2000) , Australian
LGs adopt alternative forms of communicating results to constituents, such as publishing articles in local newspapers, transmitting information during radio programmes, sending reports to taxpayers.
The users of the annual report
There is a huge body of literature on the actual and potential users of public sector reporting. Some authors identify potential users from a normative perspective (for example, Anthony, 1978; Coopers and Lybrand, 1978; Holder, 1980; Drebin et al., 1981; Jones et al., 1985; Hay, 1994; Anessi Pessina and Borgonovi, 2000; IFAC-PSC, 2000: 13) . Other authors try to identify the actual users of public organisation reporting through an empirical research. For example, Butterworth et al. (1989) and Coy et al. (1997) placed cards in the annual reports requesting users to respond to a questionnaire.
Atamian and Ganguli (1991) submitted a questionnaire to account preparers in order to collect information on annual report potential users. Mack et al. (2001) analysed Queensland LG annual report distribution lists to identify the actual recipients of annual reports, finding that there are differences in the distribution pattern of urban and rural councils.
Nevertheless, the various empirical and normative studies have failed to reach a consensus as to the identity of the users of annual reports and their information needs (Jones, 1992; Hay, 1994; Ryan et al., 2000) .
Some of the categories of potential users for a LG which are generally identified can be summarised as follows 1 :
-"External users": 1) citizens (and their representative organisations) as consumers of public services, taxpayers and ratepayers; 2) firms using public services; 3) upper levels of government; 4) oversight agencies; 5) auditors; 6) other LGs; 7) banks and lenders; 8) foreign investors, analysts, rating agencies; 9) researchers.
-"Internal users": 10) councillors and executive members; 11) public managers; 12) government employees; 13) public sector trade unions.
Research questions
The purpose of the paper is to analyse the actual role played by the annual report as a medium of accountability to stakeholders. According to a virtuous "accountability cycle", comprehensive, understandable and reliable (financial and non financial) information should be not only accessible but also diffused, providing the basis for the evaluation of the public organisation's actions and results and feeding the budgeting process. Does the Italian LG annual report satisfy such conditions?
In order to gain a better understanding on such issues, the paper makes an attempt to answer the following questions: 
Methods
In order to pursue the study's objectives, a stratified random sample of 30
LGs with a population of at least 3,000 were sent a questionnaire and asked to provide their 2000
annual reports.
The sample, the questionnaire and the checklist used to analyse the annual report are described in the following sub-paragraphs.
The sample
The sample was drawn from all
LGs with a population of at least 3,000, totalling 3,555
entities ( The composition of the sample is shown in appendix 1. Respondents were assured anonymity in order to enhance the return of the questionnaire.
The sample was extracted on the basis of the following criteria: 1) the total number of 30
LGs composing the sample was divided into two groups: 24 municipalities and 6 provinces; 2) each population stratum of municipalities should consist of a fixed number of 6 entities, while each population stratum of provinces was expected to be composed of 3 entities; 3) within each population stratum, LGs were classified according to their geographical area and were randomly extracted. These choices stem from the necessity to have a manageable number of LGs to analyse (in order to allow reasonable cost and time for the collection and elaboration of data) and, at the same time, to ensure the consideration of a sufficient number of LGs coming from groups with different characteristics. The analysis was based on 29 completed questionnaires and 26 annual reports 3 .
The questionnaire
The questionnaire was sent to the Financial Departments of LGs and aimed at:
-ascertaining which means (if any) the LGs had adopted to communicate their performance to external stakeholders for the year ended 31 st December 2000 and whether they had prepared term statements over the previous 5 years (or if such documents were, at the time of completion of the questionnaire, under preparation).
-finding out the number and the categories of users to which the annual reports were delivered, or by whom they had been requested. The following user groups were listed in the questionnaire: 1) councillors, mayor/president, cabinet members; 2) CEO, directors, managers; 3) other employees; 4) libraries; 5) research institutions; 6) other public sector entities; 7) investors/banks; 8) suppliers; 9) individual citizens; 10) others.
-gaining a better understanding on how preparers perceive the interest of actual and potential users. Preparers were required to express a judgement about the degree of interest the various categories of users may have in the annual report.
The analysis of the annual report's contents
The analysis of the contents of the Italian LG annual reports was conducted using a checklist developed on the basis of the literature on disclosure and accountability indices.
There are several studies developing indices with the aim of measuring the degree of disclosure of financial reporting in the private sector and testing its correlation with the features of the firms (size, market price, revenues, profit, etc.) or the characteristics of the industries and the markets in which they operate (Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Baker and Haslam, 1973; Buzby, 1974 Buzby, , 1975 Barrett, 1976 Barrett, , 1977 Benjamin and Stanga, 1977; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Zarzeski, 1996) .
Indices can assign the same weight to each item (Chong and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Meek et al., 1995) or weigh the items according to their importance (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1974; Barrett, 1976) . The index can be defined on the basis of relevant literature (for example, Barrett, 1976) or by interviewing/sending questionnaires to preparers or experts (for example, Buzby, 1974) .
Public sector disclosure indices are more recent. In some cases, they are used to compare the reporting practices of public organisations in different countries (Jones and Pendlebury, 1982; Pina and Torres, 1996; Coombs and Tayib, 2000) . Other studies (Ingram, 1986; Boyne and Law, 1991; Taylor and Rosair, 2000) are aimed at measuring the degree of disclosure and accountability of reporting, at pointing out weaknesses or strengths in reporting practices, at finding correlations with other variables. For example, according to Ingram et al. (1988) , who conducted a mail survey on American
LGs, the extent of disclosure of annual reports is associated with the type and the size of the government issuing the report. Ryan et al. (2002) likely to be found in the annual report were identified on the basis of previous studies (Anthony, 1978; Drebin et al., 1981; Pina and Torres, 1996; IFAC-PSC, 2000; Ryan et al., 2002) .
Two parallel indices were developed: 1) a simple index, calculated by adding 0 when the item was absent and 1 when it was present; 2) a weighted index, rating present items according to their clearness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility (the scores were: 0= absent; 1= poor; 2= sufficient; 3= very good). The scores were, for each section, expressed as a percentage of their maximum possible amount.
Finally, since the index was developed to explore the information mix of the annual report, weights were not assigned to reflect the importance of items. Rating the items would have required the expression of a subjective judgement on their importance 4 (however, indices are intrinsically subjective -Marston and Shrives, 1991).
Results
Users of Italian LG annual reports
The
LGs contacted are not always aware of their annual report's users. More than one third of the respondents declared that they were not able to identify the recipients of their 2000 annual reports and, when required to forecast the number of their future annual report's users, the great majority preferred not to answer. Table 2 summarises the results of the analysis carried out on the LGs which were able to identify their annual report's users. The most important groups of users are councillors and cabinet members, to whom all
LGs deliver their annual reports, and CEOs and managers. The number of employees who receive the annual report is not very high, especially if compared with the number of managers who receive it. Employees, however, may easily access them on an informal basis.
Since the size of a LG influences the number of its elected representatives (the larger the LG, the higher the number of elected representatives) and is likely to influence the number of managers, the decrease in the number of councillors, cabinet members and LGs, while citizens are generally a negligible group of recipients in large and small municipalities, and never required their province's annual report (this seems to be consistent with the view that provinces are more "distant" from their constituents than municipalities).
Suppliers are never found to be annual report's users, while research institutions, other
LGs, other public sector entities and banks/lenders, which account for a very small number of recipients, prefer to require the annual report of a province or a large municipality. In fact, the latter have more often access to financial institutions to fund their investments, and their annual reports are more likely to be analysed by research institutions or other LGs, which perhaps consider them as benchmarks.
The perceptions of preparers (see table 3) seem to confirm these results. According to preparers, internal recipients are the most interested users in the annual report, irrespective of the type of LG and its size. More specifically, the mayor/president (who are directly accountable to their electorate) and the executive members, who, together with the CEO, are strongly involved in the strategic (but also, in smaller municipalities, in the day-by-day) decision making, are considered as being the most interested group of annual report users. Other employees and councillors are the other categories of users who are judged as being quite interested in the annual report. On the contrary, external stakeholders, such as other LGs, lenders, suppliers and citizens are not felt to be strongly interested in the LG reports. It must be noted, however, that, in larger LGs (municipalities with at least 100,000 inhabitants; provinces), lenders are generally considered to be slightly more interested. Preparers were required to rate the degree of interest of various user groups as follows: High=2; Low=1; Nil=0.
The use of alternative means to communicate results to stakeholders
The use of alternative means to communicate results is not very common in Italian LGs (table 4) . Only 2 LGs (a large municipality and a province) insert their annual report in their website, while less than 20% send a mail report to their constituents. The most important medium for communicating results, used by more than half respondents, is the press. This is probably due to Law 67/1987, requiring LGs with a population of at least 40,000 to publish an extract of their cash based-budget and results in newspapers.
In fact, not always do LGs comply with the law (see also Guarini 1999) : while all the provinces declared to publish their results, not all the largest municipalities, though expected to, did the same.
Finally, term statements are adopted mainly by the largest provinces and municipalities, while they are less common in smaller LGs. 
Analysis of the annual report's contents
The results of the analysis of the annual report's contents can be summarised as follows (see table 5 Notes to the financial statements are not generally inserted in the annual report.
When notes are added (4 LGs), they generally consist of explanations concerning law requirements, year-end adjustments made to cash data in order to obtain accrual-based results, specific items. It must be observed, however, that LGs never disclose the criteria adopted to evaluate assets and liabilities (no LG disclosed such information).
-Service performance information is generally scant.
LGs mainly rely on compulsory efficiency and effectiveness indicators, but they do not generally comment on them nor develop ad hoc indicators. About half insert detailed programme information, which is generally very long and descriptive. Only three (the largest LGs) use voluntary effectiveness indicators in their annual report.
Finally, it must be noted that, apart from the use of voluntary effectiveness indicators by the largest LGs, no other significant differences emerge in the analysis of annual report's content pattern of the various groups of LGs. Legend: S = simple index; W= weighted index.
Discussion and conclusions
Public organisations are being subjected to an increasing demand for accountability in many countries. The role of the annual report in rendering government accountable is often emphasised and sometimes questioned. According to a virtuous "accountability cycle", comprehensive, understandable and reliable (financial and non financial) information should be not only accessible but also diffused, providing inputs to the evaluation of past results and to the budgeting process. Does the annual report satisfy such conditions? This study aimed at gaining a better understanding of the role of the annual report as an accountability medium in Italian LGs.
The analysis shows that the most important recipients of the annual report are "internal" users, while there are not considerable numbers of external stakeholders who require or receive it. These results are confirmed by preparers' perceptions. According to most annual report preparers, Councillors, Mayors/ Presidents, CEOs and Executive
Members are likely to be highly interested in reading the annual report, while citizens are not. It must be observed, however, that internal users might be interested in more specific and frequent information (for example, a monthly or quarterly report referred to a specific department/service) and are also in a position to require it. Moreover, it is not clear if they actually read the reports they receive and whether they use them to support their decision making processes (on the elusive links existing between information, decision and action see, for example, Hogheim et al., 1989) .
If
LGs showed their results on their website or sent reports to citizens, we could conclude that external stakeholders do not receive/require the annual report because they can have access to information anyhow. But they do not.
LGs are not very active in communicating their results to their stakeholders. Publishing reports in newspapers is the preferred medium used to communicate performance by larger municipalities and provinces, but it is also the one which is required by law.
LGs simply comply with law also in preparing their annual report, often producing poor quality reporting, in which accrual-based results and service performance evaluation still occupy a marginal place. On the contrary, cash-and obligation-based information plays a leading role in the preparation of reporting, and it is also used to develop voluntary indicators in an effort to (approximately) evaluate efficiency and effectiveness. This is consistent with the findings of the analyses carried out by Anessi and Steccolini (1999) and Caperchione (2002) .
On the basis of such results, it must be observed that the annual report does not seem to play the role of a "general purpose" report, satisfying the information needs of the generality of potential users, nor the role of an "external" report. It is rather a report which is prepared in order to comply with very detailed law requirements and which is mainly delivered to internal stakeholders. At the same time, alternative means to communicate results are not very common, raising questions as to (i) if and (ii) how
Italian
LGs give account for their performance to their stakeholders.
The relationship between users and LG annual report preparers seems to be subject to a vicious circle:
-the latter currently do not generally perceive a strong interest from users, especially external ones. This can discourage preparers from improving annual reports, from introducing voluntary disclosure and service performance descriptions and indicators, and also from producing alternative reports.
-it is possible that users do not generally perceive the usefulness of annual reports, and this may depend on their poor content and scant readability.
The actual users which emerge from the empirical analysis may not be (and probably are not) the only people and institutions which are likely to be interested in the external communication of
LGs. Consequently, there may exist a gap between potential and actual users and a proactive attitude of LGs could contribute to bridge such gap.
As far as differences between provinces and municipalities and larger and smaller LGs are concerned, it must be observed that it is quite difficult to depict well-defined different accountability patterns. While the reporting content is quite poor in every group of entities, larger LGs seem to be slightly more open to external stakeholders and stimuli and perhaps slightly more innovative in the adoption of means to communicate results and in developing non financial measurement systems, but this should be subjected to further verification.
In fact, rather than in differences in the size and the type of government, reporting and communication practices seem to find their explanation in law requirements and old habits. The leading role of cash-based information in annual report content (and its use in elaborating voluntary indicators) is an example of the influence of the law (which confirms the importance of such accounting basis) on accounting practices, combined with organisational inertia (cash accounting has been used for years by Financial Departments, which perhaps are not yet accustomed to service performance measurement and accrual accounting -see also Caccia and Steccolini, 2002-) .
Further analyses should try to better understand (i) which (other) means (if any) are used to render LGs and other public organisations accountable, (ii) whether, with reference to such means, it is possible to identify different patterns of accountability in different public organisations and factors explaining such differences. Furthermore, (iii) the differences in the meaning taken on by the accountability concept (especially when "imported" from abroad) and their consequences on the configuration of reporting systems could also be observed in a comparative setting. Finally, (iv) the actual functions of the annual report and the actual use of financial and non-financial reporting by councillors, CEOs, Cabinet Members, managers as a consequence of public sector reforms need to be further investigated. Footnotes 1 Some studies prefer to identify a small number of user groups, whereas others tend to present a very detailed list of users;. Different criteria to select relevant users (restricting or widening their number) can be adopted.
Smaller
LGs were excluded because they were not required to produce accrual-based financial statements until 2001 and their annual reports would not have been comparable with the others'.
3 In principle, LG annual reports are a matter of public record. In practice, however, they must be obtained directly from the relevant LGs, which may sometimes prove uncooperative. Sending their annual reports generally requires
LGs to photocopy hundreds of pages and to mail them. It was not surprising, then, that, while 29 LGs returned their completed questionnaire, the annual report was provided by 27
LGs. Another annual report was not used because it was produced by a LG placed in a region where the introduction of accrual-based reporting had been postponed.
4 The judgement could have been validated asking to users. But this would have required to previously identify the latter or to rely on the judgment of a specific group (preparers, auditors, etc.) .
